Bridges and external costs:

A major capital project of this magnitude and the central role of the bridge in an integrated and diverse transportation system needs to be evaluated not just in terms of direct capital costs, but also in terms of the many external costs associated with the project.

The preservation campaign is predicated, at least to some extent, on the identification of our bridge as a truly unique heritage structure.  That is a valid point of view, but proponents cannot then use more generic or alternatively, equally unique project examples to estimate costs or to predict certainty that any particular fix and the associated price tag can be guaranteed.  What may have worked for bridges elsewhere (and many of the examples presented by bridge engineers brought in by the preservation campaign illustrate the point), may not work on the Johnson Street Bridge.  Some of the examples presented were fixed span, concrete bridges where moving parts and seismic vulnerabilities were not an issue.

Those campaigning to save the old bridge have expressly supported some scope changes to tackle deficiencies that everyone agrees on, but thus far have been less willing to realistically estimate the additional costs those scope changes might accumulate.  In fact, they have gone so far as to dismiss the estimates provided by the city, where in-house and our consulting engineers have done the homework asked of us and come up with credible, thorough and competent figures that calculate higher costs for refurbishment, and inescapable additional costs from changes to the scope of the project (timing, improvements or substitutes for pedestrian and bicycle traffic, etc.).

Potential liability exposure:
The Ashtabula Bridge in Ohio illustrates the potential liabilities associated with unforeseen structural failures.  During refurbishment, contractors found gear mechanisms central to tilting the bridge up were worn beyond repair.  That bridge remained closed for two years and had impacts that, if repeated here, could expose the city to significant liabilities for external costs (economic dislocations), well beyond the value of the capital project.

Thus far the mechanical, braking and electrical systems assessed on the Johnson Street Bridge appear to be unique and, more importantly, obsolete.  They are not in good condition and various elements are in need of immediate replacement.  Immediate for a bridge of this vintage means within a window of 3 years from the time of assessment (now a year ago), and then within a time frame that allows for design and fabrication of any replacement parts or systems for which no off-the-shelf product will be available.

Running into a problem as complex as that found in Ohio would likely add significant costs to any repair of the Blue Bridge.  Given that kind of exposure, generous contingencies are prudent.  What may be more important is that the Ashtabula Bridge remained closed for two years, a threat to our transportation system that would be intolerable for many residents of Greater Victoria and costly in a way that could dwarf our projected capital expenses.

More external costs:
The do-nothing or paint only option is not recommended in the Delcan report.  Comparisons with other bridge projects may be instructive, but not always relevant. Many examples of restored heritage bridges are, as noted, fixed spans with very different structural and functional characteristics than our drawbridge.  Comparisons with other Strauss bridges more so, and particularly lift or drawbridges, less so the Golden Gate, which is a fixed span.

External costs and impacts are more difficult to calculate than project capital costs, which has been the foundation of city work and the focus of the critics campaign.  Council’s choice has been informed also by the external costs that are relevant to our decision.  While more difficult to quantify, the potential value of externalities also may exceed capital costs, and there are no guarantees that the city is protected from liability for some of those costs.

The duty of care assigned to the city requires regular inspection to determine if our critical infrastructure is safe and functional.  That is spelled out clearly in case law if not clearly in municipal codes.  The findings of inspections then trigger action or decision points where municipal authorities (or any other public or private agency) are obliged to remedy deficiencies that have the potential to threaten the safety of the constituents or clients to whom that duty of care is owed.

In evaluating external costs, possible civil liabilities need to be assessed beyond capital costs.  The Blue Bridge is in the advanced stages of its expected life span and showing signs of its age – both in design shortcomings and in the wear and tear of the structure, foundation and movable parts. 

That current bridge analysis project life-spans of new bridges at 100 years should also be instructive for the lifecycle of the current bridge.  We know both that the design, mechanical and electrical systems are deficient and that seismic integrity of the foundation is deteriorating, and at an accelerating rate.  All of these factors must inform our decision, particularly in the most seismically vulnerable city in Canada, and would most certainly figure in any civil case resulting from injuries or loss of life in any earthquake event that we fail to plan for.

The extent of those costs and the city’s share of any liabilities would, of course, be determined on the facts, so there is likely to be a wide range of scenarios that could face the city after an earthquake that either destroyed the bridge, parts of it, or rendered it inoperable.  The magnitude of costs for civil liabilities may be usefully studied in relation to the I-35 Bridge in Minneapolis, which is covered on my page on municipal liability.  Suffice to repeat that the $37 million that the city of Minneapolis must pay out is a figure that we need to consider in determining our own potential liabilities.  It’s clearly not a hard cost of our project, but it should be just as clearly noted as a potential external cost that the city and its taxpayers could face.

Another external, legal liability cost, and again difficult to calculate, is that associated with the economic impacts of a similar range of failures.  Even in a modest earthquake, the existing bridge could be locked shut, or locked open for that matter, and create at least short term headaches for our transportation systems.  Road closures and diversions necessary to redirect traffic around the bridge crossing would affect downtown business and potentially radiate impacts across Victoria and into neighbouring municipalities. 

A more predictable and potentially expensive problem would be access to and from Point Hope Shipyard.  We’re required by federal legislative authority to keep our navigable waters clear for marine transportation and our failure to do so, whether by neglect through deliberate avoidance of our duty of care to maintain infrastructure, or by default, if an earthquake closes it for us, we may be liable for the loss of business suffered by the shipyard.

There are no guarantees that any court action would find the city liable or negligent, but case law again suggests that public agencies or their contractors are responsible for the decisions they make with respect to care and upkeep of their infrastructure and, where they ignore the potential impacts, can be held financially liable for business losses.  The experience of Translink and the Canada Line contractors in Vancouver is relevant to our project.  The “cheaper” option was central to a civil case brought by a Cambie Street merchant over the loss of business. The courts found only that the project created a “nuisance”, but that was enough to award what may be the first of many claims against the project that could be comparable to the laibilities we face with our bridge. 

Municipalities and public agencies frequently pay out claims for injuries and other costs (including lost wages) in simple cases of neglect like an unrepaired sidewalk or more complex ones like rockfalls on the Sea to Sky highway.  Those external costs for economic impacts are potentially more significant than those for injury or loss of life.  These too, are external costs above and beyond capital costs, and that too, must also figure into the city’s decision.

The closures also inflate the potential costs of refurbishment, not accounted for in capital and contingency calculations.  Closures for refurbishment are more lengthy and the exposure to potentially unforeseen deficiencies that could extend closures even further are plausible scenarios.  The existing bridge was built to minimize closures and likewise, the availability of the more rational and economically efficient replacement project provides a clear choice for the city.  The Cambie St. decision suggests that choosing “cheaper” construction or repair methods merely shifts costs to other stakeholders and may ultimately still be the responsibility of the public agency involved.  It undermines the credibility of refurbishment as an effective cost containment strategy and complicates the valuation of cost containment strategies.

Going back to the comparisons provided by the engineers with Portland experience, the number of bridges available as alternatives would likely reduce their liability exposure and the potential for pivotal and significant economic dislocation that faces Victoria.

Other external costs: